|  | 
|  | 1 | +/************************************************************************* | 
|  | 2 | + * Written in 2020-2022 by Elichai Turkel                                * | 
|  | 3 | + * To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all    * | 
|  | 4 | + * copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this  * | 
|  | 5 | + * file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed     * | 
|  | 6 | + * without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see       * | 
|  | 7 | + * EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 * | 
|  | 8 | + *************************************************************************/ | 
|  | 9 | + | 
|  | 10 | +#include <stdio.h> | 
|  | 11 | +#include <assert.h> | 
|  | 12 | +#include <string.h> | 
|  | 13 | + | 
|  | 14 | +#include <secp256k1.h> | 
|  | 15 | + | 
|  | 16 | +#include "random.h" | 
|  | 17 | + | 
|  | 18 | + | 
|  | 19 | + | 
|  | 20 | +int main(void) { | 
|  | 21 | +    /* Instead of signing the message directly, we must sign a 32-byte hash. | 
|  | 22 | +     * Here the message is "Hello, world!" and the hash function was SHA-256. | 
|  | 23 | +     * An actual implementation should just call SHA-256, but this example | 
|  | 24 | +     * hardcodes the output to avoid depending on an additional library. | 
|  | 25 | +     * See https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/81115/if-someone-wanted-to-pretend-to-be-satoshi-by-posting-a-fake-signature-to-defrau/81116#81116 */ | 
|  | 26 | +    unsigned char msg_hash[32] = { | 
|  | 27 | +        0x31, 0x5F, 0x5B, 0xDB, 0x76, 0xD0, 0x78, 0xC4, | 
|  | 28 | +        0x3B, 0x8A, 0xC0, 0x06, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0x01, 0x64, | 
|  | 29 | +        0x61, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0xCE, 0x77, 0xC8, 0x69, 0x34, | 
|  | 30 | +        0x5B, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xC7, 0x58, 0x94, 0xED, 0xD3, | 
|  | 31 | +    }; | 
|  | 32 | +    unsigned char seckey[32]; | 
|  | 33 | +    unsigned char randomize[32]; | 
|  | 34 | +    unsigned char compressed_pubkey[33]; | 
|  | 35 | +    unsigned char serialized_signature[64]; | 
|  | 36 | +    size_t len; | 
|  | 37 | +    int is_signature_valid; | 
|  | 38 | +    int return_val; | 
|  | 39 | +    secp256k1_pubkey pubkey; | 
|  | 40 | +    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; | 
|  | 41 | +    /* The specification in secp256k1.h states that `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create` needs | 
|  | 42 | +     * a context object initialized for signing and `secp256k1_ecdsa_verify` needs | 
|  | 43 | +     * a context initialized for verification, which is why we create a context | 
|  | 44 | +     * for both signing and verification with the SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN and | 
|  | 45 | +     * SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY flags. */ | 
|  | 46 | +    secp256k1_context* ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); | 
|  | 47 | +    if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) { | 
|  | 48 | +        printf("Failed to generate randomness\n"); | 
|  | 49 | +        return 1; | 
|  | 50 | +    } | 
|  | 51 | +    /* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel | 
|  | 52 | +     * leakage See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more | 
|  | 53 | +     * information about it. This should never fail. */ | 
|  | 54 | +    return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize); | 
|  | 55 | +    assert(return_val); | 
|  | 56 | + | 
|  | 57 | +    /*** Key Generation ***/ | 
|  | 58 | + | 
|  | 59 | +    /* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's | 
|  | 60 | +     * order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this | 
|  | 61 | +     * happening is negligible. */ | 
|  | 62 | +    while (1) { | 
|  | 63 | +        if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) { | 
|  | 64 | +            printf("Failed to generate randomness\n"); | 
|  | 65 | +            return 1; | 
|  | 66 | +        } | 
|  | 67 | +        if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey)) { | 
|  | 68 | +            break; | 
|  | 69 | +        } | 
|  | 70 | +    } | 
|  | 71 | + | 
|  | 72 | +    /* Public key creation using a valid context with a verified secret key should never fail */ | 
|  | 73 | +    return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, seckey); | 
|  | 74 | +    assert(return_val); | 
|  | 75 | + | 
|  | 76 | +    /* Serialize the pubkey in a compressed form(33 bytes). Should always return 1. */ | 
|  | 77 | +    len = sizeof(compressed_pubkey); | 
|  | 78 | +    return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, compressed_pubkey, &len, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED); | 
|  | 79 | +    assert(return_val); | 
|  | 80 | +    /* Should be the same size as the size of the output, because we passed a 33 byte array. */ | 
|  | 81 | +    assert(len == sizeof(compressed_pubkey)); | 
|  | 82 | + | 
|  | 83 | +    /*** Signing ***/ | 
|  | 84 | + | 
|  | 85 | +    /* Generate an ECDSA signature `noncefp` and `ndata` allows you to pass a | 
|  | 86 | +     * custom nonce function, passing `NULL` will use the RFC-6979 safe default. | 
|  | 87 | +     * Signing with a valid context, verified secret key | 
|  | 88 | +     * and the default nonce function should never fail. */ | 
|  | 89 | +    return_val = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &sig, msg_hash, seckey, NULL, NULL); | 
|  | 90 | +    assert(return_val); | 
|  | 91 | + | 
|  | 92 | +    /* Serialize the signature in a compact form. Should always return 1 | 
|  | 93 | +     * according to the documentation in secp256k1.h. */ | 
|  | 94 | +    return_val = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, serialized_signature, &sig); | 
|  | 95 | +    assert(return_val); | 
|  | 96 | + | 
|  | 97 | + | 
|  | 98 | +    /*** Verification ***/ | 
|  | 99 | + | 
|  | 100 | +    /* Deserialize the signature. This will return 0 if the signature can't be parsed correctly. */ | 
|  | 101 | +    if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(ctx, &sig, serialized_signature)) { | 
|  | 102 | +        printf("Failed parsing the signature\n"); | 
|  | 103 | +        return 1; | 
|  | 104 | +    } | 
|  | 105 | + | 
|  | 106 | +    /* Deserialize the public key. This will return 0 if the public key can't be parsed correctly. */ | 
|  | 107 | +    if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ctx, &pubkey, compressed_pubkey, sizeof(compressed_pubkey))) { | 
|  | 108 | +        printf("Failed parsing the public key\n"); | 
|  | 109 | +        return 1; | 
|  | 110 | +    } | 
|  | 111 | + | 
|  | 112 | +    /* Verify a signature. This will return 1 if it's valid and 0 if it's not. */ | 
|  | 113 | +    is_signature_valid = secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg_hash, &pubkey); | 
|  | 114 | + | 
|  | 115 | +    printf("Is the signature valid? %s\n", is_signature_valid ? "true" : "false"); | 
|  | 116 | +    printf("Secret Key: "); | 
|  | 117 | +    print_hex(seckey, sizeof(seckey)); | 
|  | 118 | +    printf("Public Key: "); | 
|  | 119 | +    print_hex(compressed_pubkey, sizeof(compressed_pubkey)); | 
|  | 120 | +    printf("Signature: "); | 
|  | 121 | +    print_hex(serialized_signature, sizeof(serialized_signature)); | 
|  | 122 | + | 
|  | 123 | + | 
|  | 124 | +    /* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */ | 
|  | 125 | +    secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); | 
|  | 126 | + | 
|  | 127 | +    /* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them. | 
|  | 128 | +     * This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for | 
|  | 129 | +     * example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS | 
|  | 130 | +     * swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros. | 
|  | 131 | +     * | 
|  | 132 | +     * TODO: Prevent these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler | 
|  | 133 | +     * will remove any writes that aren't used. */ | 
|  | 134 | +    memset(seckey, 0, sizeof(seckey)); | 
|  | 135 | + | 
|  | 136 | +    return 0; | 
|  | 137 | +} | 
0 commit comments