diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs index 914e5d9a2c5..b76da83c075 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs @@ -139,7 +139,10 @@ fn test_monitor_and_persister_update_fail() { let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); - if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan.2) { + { + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan.2); if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) { // Check that even though the persister is returning a InProgress, // because the update is bogus, ultimately the error that's returned @@ -148,7 +151,7 @@ fn test_monitor_and_persister_update_fail() { logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::chain::chainmonitor".to_string(), regex::Regex::new("Persistence of ChannelMonitorUpdate for channel [0-9a-f]* in progress").unwrap(), 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed); } else { assert!(false); } - } else { assert!(false); }; + } check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); @@ -932,7 +935,8 @@ fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) { // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order. - let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() { + let (nodes_0_event, events_3) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &events_3); + let messages_a = match nodes_0_event { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -944,8 +948,14 @@ fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), }; + + let (nodes_2_event, events_3) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events_3); + let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(nodes_2_event); + assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs { - match events_3.remove(1) { + let (nodes_2_event, _events_3) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events_3); + match nodes_2_event { MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); Some(msg.clone()) @@ -953,8 +963,6 @@ fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } else { None }; - let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0)); - assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); // Now deliver the new messages... @@ -988,6 +996,7 @@ fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) { check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let bs_revoke_and_commit = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + // As both messages are for nodes[1], they're in order. assert_eq!(bs_revoke_and_commit.len(), 2); match bs_revoke_and_commit[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { @@ -1415,9 +1424,12 @@ fn monitor_failed_no_reestablish_response() { let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2; { - let mut lock; - get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived; - get_channel_ref!(nodes[1], lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived; + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let mut node_1_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_1_peer_state_lock; + get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived; + get_channel_ref!(nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived; } // Route the payment and deliver the initial commitment_signed (with a monitor update failure diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 03a150e4fe2..7a9ed922746 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use core::{cmp, mem}; use core::cell::RefCell; use crate::io::Read; -use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock}; +use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock}; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use core::time::Duration; use core::ops::Deref; @@ -293,10 +293,10 @@ struct ReceiveError { type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>); -/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a +/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a -/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in +/// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it. struct MsgHandleErrInternal { @@ -434,14 +434,6 @@ struct ClaimablePayments { pending_claiming_payments: HashMap, } -// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test): -pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { - pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, - /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except - /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). - pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, -} - /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with /// quite some time lag. @@ -461,10 +453,19 @@ pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction { EmitEvent { event: events::Event }, } -/// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold -/// the latest Init features we heard from the peer. -struct PeerState { +/// State we hold per-peer. +pub(super) struct PeerState { + /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`. + /// + /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a + /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the + /// `channel_id`. + pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, + /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer. latest_features: InitFeatures, + /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except + /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). + pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, } /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is @@ -580,13 +581,13 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = C // | | // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds // | | -// | |__`channel_state` -// | | -// | |__`id_to_peer` +// | |__`per_peer_state` // | | -// | |__`short_to_chan_info` -// | | -// | |__`per_peer_state` +// | |__`peer_state` +// | | +// | |__`id_to_peer` +// | | +// | |__`short_to_chan_info` // | | // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases` // | | @@ -620,12 +621,6 @@ where best_block: RwLock, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, - /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] - pub(super) channel_state: Mutex::Signer>>, - #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] - channel_state: Mutex::Signer>>, - /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed @@ -692,6 +687,9 @@ where /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during /// the handling of the events. /// + /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the + /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps. + /// /// TODO: /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately @@ -741,15 +739,24 @@ where /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future. highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize, - /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like). + /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently + /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest + /// features. + /// /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels /// are currently open with that peer. + /// /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then - /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a - /// new channel. + /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for + /// channels. + /// + /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time. /// /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. - per_peer_state: RwLock>>, + #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::Signer>>>>, + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock::Signer>>>>, /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. pending_events: Mutex>, @@ -1144,8 +1151,8 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { { // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon // entering the macro. - assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok()); assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok()); + assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok()); } let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2); @@ -1175,7 +1182,31 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } if !msg_events.is_empty() { - $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events); + let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events); + } + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + { + if let None = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) { + // This shouldn't occour in tests unless an unkown counterparty_node_id + // has been passed to our message handling functions. + let expected_error_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", $counterparty_node_id); + match err.action { + msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { ref channel_id, ref data } + } + => { + assert_eq!(*data, expected_error_str); + if let Some((err_channel_id, _user_channel_id)) = chan_id { + assert_eq!(*channel_id, err_channel_id); + } + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + } } // Return error in case higher-API need one @@ -1409,10 +1440,6 @@ where best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block), - channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{ - by_id: HashMap::new(), - pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), - }), outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()), pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(), @@ -1433,7 +1460,7 @@ where highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0), - per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()), + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()), pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), @@ -1500,37 +1527,37 @@ where return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) }); } + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. + debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }); + } + + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); let channel = { - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) { - Some(peer_state) => { - let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); - let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap(); - let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; - let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; - match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, - their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias) - { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(e) => { - self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); - return Err(e); - }, - } + let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); + let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; + let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; + match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, + their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, + self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias) + { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(e) => { + self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); + return Err(e); }, - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }), } }; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. - debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); - let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { if cfg!(fuzzing) { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() }); @@ -1540,70 +1567,75 @@ where }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { + + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id: their_network_key, msg: res, }); Ok(temporary_channel_id) } - fn list_channels_with_filter::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { + fn list_channels_with_filter::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { let mut res = Vec::new(); + // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res` + // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without + // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside + // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is + // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for + // the same channel. + res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); { - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len()); - for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) { - let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); - let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = - channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); - res.push(ChannelDetails { - channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), - counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - features: InitFeatures::empty(), - unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, - forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), - // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value - // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` - // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). - // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the - // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. - outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { - Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, - outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), - }, - funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), - // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so - // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. - channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, - short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), - outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, - inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), - channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), - unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, - balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, - inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, - outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, - next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, - user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), - confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), - confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), - force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), - is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), - is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), - is_usable: channel.is_live(), - is_public: channel.should_announce(), - inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), - inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), - config: Some(channel.config()), - }); - } - } - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - for chan in res.iter_mut() { - if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) { - chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) { + let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); + let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = + channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); + res.push(ChannelDetails { + channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), + counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(), + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, + forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), + // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value + // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` + // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). + // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the + // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. + outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { + Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, + outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), + }, + funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), + // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so + // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. + channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, + short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), + outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, + inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), + channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, + balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, + inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, + outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, + next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, + user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), + confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), + force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), + is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), + is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), + is_usable: channel.is_live(), + is_public: channel.should_announce(), + inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), + inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), + config: Some(channel.config()), + }); + } } } res @@ -1651,24 +1683,18 @@ where let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>; let result: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) }); + } + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){ - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() }); - } - let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = { - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { - Some(peer_state) => { - let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap(); - let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; - chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)? - }, - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }), - } - }; + let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?; failed_htlcs = htlcs; // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. @@ -1682,7 +1708,7 @@ where } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg: shutdown_msg }); @@ -1690,7 +1716,7 @@ where if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: channel_update }); } @@ -1698,7 +1724,7 @@ where } break Ok(()); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) } }; @@ -1779,13 +1805,15 @@ where /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason. fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool) -> Result { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id); let mut chan = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); - } + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) }); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg { self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() }); } else { @@ -1793,14 +1821,14 @@ where } remove_channel!(self, chan) } else { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) }); } }; log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast)); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } @@ -1812,14 +1840,18 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) { Ok(counterparty_node_id) => { - self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push( - events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: counterparty_node_id, - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } - }, - } - ); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push( + events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + } + ); + } Ok(()) }, Err(e) => Err(e) @@ -2061,8 +2093,7 @@ where if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing { if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop { let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option { + let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option { None => { // unknown_next_peer // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a // phantom or an intercept. @@ -2075,13 +2106,20 @@ where break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); } }, - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()), + Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())), }; - let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt { - let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) { + let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) { None => { - // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have - // no consistency guarantees. + // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps + // have no consistency guarantees. break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); }, Some(chan) => chan @@ -2187,7 +2225,7 @@ where /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event. /// - /// May be called with channel_state already locked! + /// May be called with peer_state already locked! fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { if !chan.should_announce() { return Err(LightningError { @@ -2206,7 +2244,7 @@ where /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id), /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel. - /// May be called with channel_state already locked! + /// May be called with peer_state already locked! fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) { @@ -2259,18 +2297,20 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let err: Result<(), _> = loop { - let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { + let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}), - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), }; - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" }); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) { match { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey { - return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}); - } if !chan.get().is_live() { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()}); } @@ -2307,7 +2347,7 @@ where } log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id)); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], @@ -2323,7 +2363,8 @@ where } } else { // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the - // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map. + // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the + // `channel_by_id` map. // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps. return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}); } @@ -2496,20 +2537,30 @@ where /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel. fn funding_transaction_generated_intern::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result>( - &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput + &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput ) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) }) + } + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; let (chan, msg) = { - let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { - Some(mut chan) => { - let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; - - (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) - .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { - MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) - } else { unreachable!(); }) - , chan) - }, - None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) }, + let (res, chan) = { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { + Some(mut chan) => { + let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; + + (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) + .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { + MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) + } else { unreachable!(); }) + , chan) + }, + None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) }, + } }; match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) { Ok(funding_msg) => { @@ -2521,12 +2572,11 @@ where } }; - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?"); }, @@ -2660,34 +2710,32 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop( &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, ); - { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - for channel_id in channel_ids { - let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id) - .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)), - })? - .get_counterparty_node_id(); - if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(), - }); - } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) }); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for channel_id in channel_ids { + if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id), + }); } - for channel_id in channel_ids { - let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap(); - if !channel.update_config(config) { - continue; - } - if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg }); - } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }); - } + } + for channel_id in channel_ids { + let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap(); + if !channel.update_config(config) { + continue; + } + if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg }); + } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, + }); } } Ok(()) @@ -2715,21 +2763,30 @@ where /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id` - pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { + pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) { - Some(chan) => { - if !chan.is_usable() { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id)) + let next_hop_scid = { + let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { + if !chan.is_usable() { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id)) + }) + } + chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) + }, + None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id) }) } - chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) - }, - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id)) - }) + } else { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) }); + } }; let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id) @@ -2899,16 +2956,22 @@ where } } } - let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), None => { forwarding_channel_not_found!(); continue; } }; - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + forwarding_channel_not_found!(); + continue; + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { forwarding_channel_not_found!(); continue; @@ -3255,10 +3318,14 @@ where let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - for (chan_id, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() { - let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); - if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); + if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } + } } should_persist @@ -3287,49 +3354,52 @@ where let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { - let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); - if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } - - if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() { - let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id); - handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id())); - if needs_close { return false; } - } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { + let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); + if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } + + if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() { + let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id); + handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id)); + if needs_close { return false; } + } - match chan.channel_update_status() { - ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged), - ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged), - ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled), - ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled), - ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => { - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; - chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled); - }, - ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => { - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; - chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled); - }, - _ => {}, - } + match chan.channel_update_status() { + ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged), + ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged), + ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled), + ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled), + ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled); + }, + ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled); + }, + _ => {}, + } - chan.maybe_expire_prev_config(); + chan.maybe_expire_prev_config(); - true - }); + true + }); + } } self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| { @@ -3461,13 +3531,19 @@ where &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey ) { - let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = - match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { - self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get()) - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) - }; + let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { + self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get()) + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + } + } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) } + }; for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) { let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone()); @@ -3481,11 +3557,12 @@ where fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) { #[cfg(debug_assertions)] { - // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function. + // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this + // function. // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for - // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this - // function with the `channel_state` locked would. - assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok()); + // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` locks, which calling this + // function with the `per_peer_state` aquired would. + assert!(self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok()); } //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can @@ -3600,17 +3677,26 @@ where let mut expected_amt_msat = None; let mut valid_mpp = true; let mut errs = Vec::new(); - let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); for htlc in sources.iter() { - let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), None => { valid_mpp = false; break; } }; - if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) { + if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) { + valid_mpp = false; + break; + } + + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + + if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) { valid_mpp = false; break; } @@ -3621,6 +3707,7 @@ where valid_mpp = false; break; } + expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat); if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload { // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check @@ -3636,13 +3723,13 @@ where claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value; } if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() { - mem::drop(channel_state); + mem::drop(per_peer_state); self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash); log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!"); return; } if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() { - mem::drop(channel_state); + mem::drop(per_peer_state); self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash); log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.", expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat); @@ -3650,9 +3737,9 @@ where } if valid_mpp { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { - if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } - if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, - payment_preimage, + if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); } + if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(per_peer_state.take().unwrap(), + htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage, |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })) { if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action { @@ -3663,7 +3750,7 @@ where } } } - mem::drop(channel_state); + mem::drop(per_peer_state); if !valid_mpp { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); @@ -3684,73 +3771,95 @@ where } fn claim_funds_from_hop) -> Option>(&self, - mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard::Signer>>, + per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard::Signer>>>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc) -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { - Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => { - if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option { + + let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()), + None => None + }; + + let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() { + let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap(); + let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id); + (found_channel, Some(peer_state)) + } else { (false, None) }; + + if found_channel { + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap(); + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); + match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { + Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => { + if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option { + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, + e => { + log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug }, + "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, e); + let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(); + mem::drop(peer_state_opt); + mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock); + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); + return Err((counterparty_node_id, err)); + } + } + if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { + log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", + log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fee: None, + commitment_signed, + } + }); + } + mem::drop(peer_state_opt); + mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock); + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); + Ok(()) + } else { + Ok(()) + } + }, + Err((e, monitor_update)) => { match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, e => { - log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug }, - "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update + // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream + // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try + // again on restart. + log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info }, + "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}", payment_preimage, e); - let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(); - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); - return Err((counterparty_node_id, err)); - } + }, } - if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", - log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed, - } - }); + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id); + if drop { + chan.remove_entry(); } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); - Ok(()) - } else { - Ok(()) - } - }, - Err((e, monitor_update)) => { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update - // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream - // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try - // again on restart. - log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info }, - "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}", - payment_preimage, e); - }, - } - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id); - if drop { - chan.remove_entry(); - } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); - Err((counterparty_node_id, res)) - }, + mem::drop(peer_state_opt); + mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock); + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); + Err((counterparty_node_id, res)) + }, + } + } else { + // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting + // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped. + unreachable!() } } else { let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { @@ -3770,7 +3879,8 @@ where log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", payment_preimage, update_res); } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); + mem::drop(peer_state_opt); + mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock); // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are @@ -3785,15 +3895,14 @@ where self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events); } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) { + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => { - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger); }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; - let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage, + let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage, |htlc_claim_value_msat| { if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat { @@ -3905,22 +4014,39 @@ where htlc_forwards } - fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) { + fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let htlc_forwards; let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return, + let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id { + Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), + None => { + // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the + // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed. + let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { + Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), + None => return, + } + } + }; + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock; + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return } + peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let mut channel = { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){ + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return, + } }; if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { return; } - let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() { // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a @@ -3935,9 +4061,9 @@ where }) } else { None } } else { None }; - htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs); + htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs); if let Some(upd) = channel_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id) @@ -3997,16 +4123,18 @@ where fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) }); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => { if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() }); } - if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() }); - } if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { @@ -4016,18 +4144,18 @@ where msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), } } }; - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel); return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() }); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id), }); } hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() }); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }); } } Ok(()) @@ -4057,19 +4185,24 @@ where }, Ok(res) => res }; - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels { if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id), }); @@ -4094,17 +4227,19 @@ where fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (value, output_script, user_id) = { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); - } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan); (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -4119,21 +4254,23 @@ where } fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) + } let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = { let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); - } (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; - // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state + // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state // lock before watch_channel match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, @@ -4158,9 +4295,12 @@ where channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now }, } - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { + // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the + // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing + // the channel above. + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, @@ -4176,12 +4316,12 @@ where i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()); } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: funding_msg, }); if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg); + send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg); } e.insert(chan); } @@ -4192,13 +4332,16 @@ where fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let funding_tx = { let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + } + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) { Ok(update) => update, Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan), @@ -4219,11 +4362,11 @@ where }, } if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg); + send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg); } funding_tx }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid()); @@ -4232,18 +4375,20 @@ where } fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt { log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); @@ -4255,7 +4400,7 @@ where // announcement_signatures. log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); @@ -4266,21 +4411,22 @@ where Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>; let result: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() { log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.", @@ -4303,7 +4449,7 @@ where } if let Some(msg) = shutdown { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg, }); @@ -4311,7 +4457,7 @@ where break Ok(()); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) { @@ -4325,17 +4471,19 @@ where } fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + } let (tx, chan_option) = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); @@ -4349,7 +4497,7 @@ where (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry))) } else { (tx, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { @@ -4358,8 +4506,9 @@ where } if let Some(chan) = chan_option { if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } @@ -4379,14 +4528,15 @@ where //but we should prevent it anyway. let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close, @@ -4412,52 +4562,58 @@ where }; try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = { - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; - self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id); Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 { let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned()); try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan); @@ -4465,18 +4621,20 @@ where try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan); Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) { Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan), @@ -4493,12 +4651,12 @@ where return Err(e); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: revoke_and_ack, }); if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -4512,7 +4670,7 @@ where } Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } @@ -4611,13 +4769,15 @@ where fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new(); let res = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan); @@ -4641,7 +4801,7 @@ where } else { unreachable!(); } } if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates, }); @@ -4653,7 +4813,7 @@ where chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id); @@ -4674,34 +4834,37 @@ where } fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if !chan.get().is_usable() { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError})); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures( self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan), // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, @@ -4709,23 +4872,28 @@ where update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(), }); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err. fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result { - let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), None => { // It's not a local channel return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist) } }; - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { if chan.get().should_announce() { @@ -4753,14 +4921,16 @@ where fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let htlc_forwards; let need_lnd_workaround = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending @@ -4770,7 +4940,7 @@ where &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan); let mut channel_update = None; if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); @@ -4787,14 +4957,14 @@ where } let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take(); htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption( - &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order, + &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs); if let Some(upd) = channel_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } need_lnd_workaround }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; @@ -4819,7 +4989,7 @@ where MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; @@ -4829,34 +4999,47 @@ where }, MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) | MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { - let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); - failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); + let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id { + Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id), + None => { + // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the + // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed. + let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned() + } + }; + if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { + let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event { + ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() } + } else { + ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed + }; + self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + }); + } } - let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event { - ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() } - } else { - ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed - }; - self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } - }, - }); } }, MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => { - self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id); + self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref()); }, } } @@ -4885,47 +5068,49 @@ where let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - - by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { - match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) { - Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { - if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { - failed_htlcs.push(( - holding_cell_failed_htlcs, - *channel_id, - chan.get_counterparty_node_id() - )); - } - if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: commitment_update, - }); - }, - e => { - has_monitor_update = true; - let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); - if close_channel { return false; } - }, + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { + match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) { + Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { + if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { + failed_htlcs.push(( + holding_cell_failed_htlcs, + *channel_id, + chan.get_counterparty_node_id() + )); } + if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt { + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + updates: commitment_update, + }); + }, + e => { + has_monitor_update = true; + let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); + if close_channel { return false; } + }, + } + } + true + }, + Err(e) => { + let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); + // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us + !close_channel } - true - }, - Err(e) => { - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); - // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us - !close_channel } - } - }); + }); + } } let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty(); @@ -4947,45 +5132,47 @@ where let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new(); let mut has_update = false; { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - - by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { - match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { - Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => { - if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { - has_update = true; - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, - }); - } - if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { - // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back - // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast. - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { + match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { + Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => { + if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { + has_update = true; + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } + if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { + // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back + // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast. + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } - self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); + self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); - self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); - false - } else { true } - }, - Err(e) => { - has_update = true; - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); - !close_channel + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); + self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); + false + } else { true } + }, + Err(e) => { + has_update = true; + let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); + !close_channel + } } - } - }); + }); + } } for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { @@ -5215,10 +5402,15 @@ where pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs { let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new(); - for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() { - for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() { - if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source { - inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id()); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() { + for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() { + if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source { + inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id()); + } } } } @@ -5293,6 +5485,19 @@ where R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { + /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated. + /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if + /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer + /// is always placed next to each other. + /// + /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for + /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains + /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a` + /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array. + /// + /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate` + /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among + /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under. fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new()); PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { @@ -5312,8 +5517,16 @@ where } let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 { + let mut peer_pending_events = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut peer_pending_events, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events); + pending_events.append(&mut peer_pending_events); + } + } if !pending_events.is_empty() { events.replace(pending_events); @@ -5466,11 +5679,14 @@ where } fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option)> { - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len()); - for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() { - if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { - res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash)); + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() { + if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { + res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash)); + } } } res @@ -5509,89 +5725,92 @@ where let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { - let res = f(channel); - if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res { - for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { - let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel); - timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), - HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() })); - } - if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { - send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); - if channel.is_usable() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| { + let res = f(channel); + if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res { + for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { + let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel); + timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), + HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() })); + } + if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { + send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); + if channel.is_usable() { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, + }); + } + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } - } - emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel); + emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel); - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: announcement_sigs, - }); - if let Some(height) = height_opt { - if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { - msg: announcement, - // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, - // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. - update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(), - }); + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: announcement_sigs, + }); + if let Some(height) = height_opt { + if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { + msg: announcement, + // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, + // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. + update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(), + }); + } } } - } - if channel.is_our_channel_ready() { - if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { - // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it - // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we - // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. - // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever - // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info - // is always consistent. - let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); - let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); - assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()), - "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels", - fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW); + if channel.is_our_channel_ready() { + if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it + // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we + // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. + // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever + // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info + // is always consistent. + let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); + let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); + assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()), + "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels", + fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW); + } } - } - } else if let Err(reason) = res { - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel); - // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was - // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. - failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update + } else if let Err(reason) = res { + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel); + // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was + // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); + self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + data: reason_message, + } }, }); + return false; } - let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); - self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), - data: reason_message, - } }, - }); - return false; - } - true - }); + true + }); + } } if let Some(height) = height_opt { @@ -5793,14 +6012,15 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut no_channels_remain = true; + let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" }); - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger); if chan.is_shutdown() { update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); @@ -5809,37 +6029,38 @@ where } else { no_channels_remain = false; } - } - true - }); - pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| { - match msg { - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false, - } - }); + true + }); + pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| { + match msg { + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false, + } + }); + } } if no_channels_remain { - self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id); + per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id); } + mem::drop(per_peer_state); for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); @@ -5861,7 +6082,9 @@ where match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState { + channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(), + pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), })); }, hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => { @@ -5870,37 +6093,41 @@ where } } - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { - if !chan.have_received_message() { - // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the - // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now - // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just - // drop it. - false - } else { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger), - }); - true - } - } else { true }; - if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) { - if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { - node_id: *counterparty_node_id, - msg, update_msg, + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { + if !chan.have_received_message() { + // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the + // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now + // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just + // drop it. + false + } else { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger), }); + true + } + } else { true }; + if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) { + if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { + node_id: *counterparty_node_id, + msg, update_msg, + }); + } } } - } - retain - }); + retain + }); + } //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures Ok(()) } @@ -5909,22 +6136,29 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { - for chan in self.list_channels() { - if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id { - // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel - let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true); - } + let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect() + }; + for channel_id in channel_ids { + // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel + let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true); } } else { { // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again. - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { - if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return; - } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg, }); @@ -6400,19 +6634,29 @@ where } { - // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires - // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state` - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let mut unfunded_channels = 0; - for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { - unfunded_channels += 1; + let mut number_of_channels = 0; + for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len(); + for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { + if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { + unfunded_channels += 1; + } } } - ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?; - for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if channel.is_funding_initiated() { - channel.write(writer)?; + + ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?; + + for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { + if channel.is_funding_initiated() { + channel.write(writer)?; + } } } } @@ -6694,7 +6938,7 @@ where let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); - let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); + let mut peer_channels: HashMap::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut channel_closures = Vec::new(); @@ -6760,7 +7004,17 @@ where if channel.is_funding_initiated() { id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id()); } - by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + let by_id_map = entry.get_mut(); + by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new(); + by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + entry.insert(by_id_map); + } + } } } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() { // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence @@ -6815,11 +7069,13 @@ where } let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex)>())); + let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex::Signer>>)>())); for _ in 0..peer_count { let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let peer_state = PeerState { + channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()), latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?, + pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), }; per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state)); } @@ -6911,7 +7167,7 @@ where // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by // 0.0.102+ for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { - if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() { + if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() { for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() { if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source { if path.is_empty() { @@ -7059,28 +7315,32 @@ where } let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new(); - for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() { - if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { - let mut outbound_scid_alias; - loop { - outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias - .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager); - if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; } - } - chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); - } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) { - // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older - // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. - log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); - return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } - if chan.is_usable() { - if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { + for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { + let mut outbound_scid_alias; + loop { + outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias + .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager); + if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; } + } + chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); + } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) { // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } + if chan.is_usable() { + if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { + // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older + // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. + log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } } } @@ -7117,8 +7377,13 @@ where // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on // restart. let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); - if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) { - channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger); + if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){ + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) { + channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger); + } } if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) { previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger); @@ -7143,10 +7408,6 @@ where best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)), - channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder { - by_id, - pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), - }), inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key, pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments), pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) }, @@ -7167,7 +7428,7 @@ where highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize), - per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state), + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state), pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read), @@ -7197,17 +7458,24 @@ where mod tests { use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; + use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature; + use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script; + use bitcoin::Txid; use core::time::Duration; use core::sync::atomic::Ordering; use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; - use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs; - use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; + use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, OptionalField}; use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use crate::util::test_utils; + use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig; use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface}; #[test] @@ -7768,6 +8036,194 @@ mod tests { check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); } + + fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error(res_err: Result, expected_public_key: PublicKey) { + let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key); + check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err) + } + + fn check_unkown_peer_error(res_err: Result, expected_public_key: PublicKey) { + let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key); + check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err) + } + + fn check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result) { + match res_err { + Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => { + assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message); + }, + Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"), + Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() { + // Tests that our API functions and message handlers that expects a `counterparty_node_id` + // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the + // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map. + let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg); + let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr); + + // Boilerplate code to produce `open_channel` and `accept_channel` msgs more densly than + // creating dummy ones. + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); + let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg); + let accept_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Dummy values + let channel_id = [4; 32]; + let signature = Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() }); + let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); + let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]); + + // Dummy msgs + let funding_created_msg = msgs::FundingCreated { + temporary_channel_id: open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, + funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap(), + funding_output_index: 0, + signature: signature, + }; + + let funding_signed_msg = msgs::FundingSigned { + channel_id: channel_id, + signature: signature, + }; + + let channel_ready_msg = msgs::ChannelReady { + channel_id: channel_id, + next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key, + short_channel_id_alias: None, + }; + + let announcement_signatures_msg = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { + channel_id: channel_id, + short_channel_id: 0, + node_signature: signature, + bitcoin_signature: signature, + }; + + let channel_reestablish_msg = msgs::ChannelReestablish { + channel_id: channel_id, + next_local_commitment_number: 0, + next_remote_commitment_number: 0, + data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent, + }; + + let closing_signed_msg = msgs::ClosingSigned { + channel_id: channel_id, + fee_satoshis: 1000, + signature: signature, + fee_range: None, + }; + + let shutdown_msg = msgs::Shutdown { + channel_id: channel_id, + scriptpubkey: Script::new(), + }; + + let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { + version: 255, + public_key: Ok(unkown_public_key), + hop_data: [1; 20*65], + hmac: [2; 32] + }; + + let update_add_htlc_msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { + channel_id: channel_id, + htlc_id: 0, + amount_msat: 1000000, + payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]), + cltv_expiry: 821716, + onion_routing_packet + }; + + let commitment_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned { + channel_id: channel_id, + signature: signature, + htlc_signatures: Vec::new(), + }; + + let update_fee_msg = msgs::UpdateFee { + channel_id: channel_id, + feerate_per_kw: 1000, + }; + + let malformed_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{ + channel_id: channel_id, + htlc_id: 0, + sha256_of_onion: [1; 32], + failure_code: 0x8000, + }; + + let fulfill_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{ + channel_id: channel_id, + htlc_id: 0, + payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]), + }; + + let fail_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{ + channel_id: channel_id, + htlc_id: 0, + reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()}, + }; + + let revoke_and_ack_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK { + channel_id: channel_id, + per_commitment_secret: [1; 32], + next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key, + }; + + // Test the API functions and message handlers. + check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key); + + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&unkown_public_key, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg); + + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&unkown_public_key, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_msg); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key); + + nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&unkown_public_key, &funding_created_msg); + + nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&unkown_public_key, &funding_signed_msg); + + nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&unkown_public_key, &channel_ready_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&unkown_public_key, &announcement_signatures_msg); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key); + + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&unkown_public_key, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &shutdown_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&unkown_public_key, &closing_signed_msg); + + nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&unkown_public_key, &channel_reestablish_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &update_add_htlc_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&unkown_public_key, &commitment_signed_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &malformed_update_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fail_update_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fulfill_update_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&unkown_public_key, &revoke_and_ack_msg); + + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&unkown_public_key, &update_fee_msg); + } } #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))] diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs index a7e1f8cfd63..bcfa571f9ac 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs @@ -558,22 +558,102 @@ macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs { } } +/// Fetches the first `msg_event` to the passed `node_id` in the passed `msg_events` vec. +/// Returns the `msg_event`, along with an updated `msg_events` vec with the message removed. +/// +/// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate` +/// `msg_events` are stored under specific peers, this function does not fetch such `msg_events` as +/// such messages are intended to all peers. +pub fn remove_first_msg_event_to_node(msg_node_id: &PublicKey, msg_events: &Vec) -> (MessageSendEvent, Vec) { + let ev_index = msg_events.iter().position(|e| { match e { + MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => { + false + }, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => { + false + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { node_id, .. } => { + node_id == msg_node_id + }, + }}); + if ev_index.is_some() { + let mut updated_msg_events = msg_events.to_vec(); + let ev = updated_msg_events.remove(ev_index.unwrap()); + (ev, updated_msg_events) + } else { + panic!("Couldn't find any MessageSendEvent to the node!") + } +} + #[cfg(test)] macro_rules! get_channel_ref { - ($node: expr, $lock: ident, $channel_id: expr) => { + ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: ident, $peer_state_lock: ident, $channel_id: expr) => { { - $lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - $lock.by_id.get_mut(&$channel_id).unwrap() + $per_peer_state_lock = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + $peer_state_lock = $per_peer_state_lock.get(&$counterparty_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + $peer_state_lock.channel_by_id.get_mut(&$channel_id).unwrap() } } } #[cfg(test)] macro_rules! get_feerate { - ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { + ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { { - let mut lock; - let chan = get_channel_ref!($node, lock, $channel_id); + let mut per_peer_state_lock; + let mut peer_state_lock; + let chan = get_channel_ref!($node, $counterparty_node, per_peer_state_lock, peer_state_lock, $channel_id); chan.get_feerate() } } @@ -581,10 +661,11 @@ macro_rules! get_feerate { #[cfg(test)] macro_rules! get_opt_anchors { - ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { + ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { { - let mut lock; - let chan = get_channel_ref!($node, lock, $channel_id); + let mut per_peer_state_lock; + let mut peer_state_lock; + let chan = get_channel_ref!($node, $counterparty_node, per_peer_state_lock, peer_state_lock, $channel_id); chan.opt_anchors() } } @@ -1273,13 +1354,14 @@ macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance { let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = { let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert!(events.len() <= 2); - (match events[0] { + let (node_a_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + (match node_a_event { MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); (*msg).clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone())) + }, events.get(0).map(|e| e.clone())) }; check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1); if $fail_backwards { @@ -1320,11 +1402,20 @@ macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance { expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!($node_a, vec![$crate::util::events::HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel{ node_id: Some($node_b.node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: $commitment_signed.channel_id }]); check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1); - let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1); - if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] { - assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); - } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); } + let node_a_per_peer_state = $node_a.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut number_of_msg_events = 0; + for (cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in node_a_per_peer_state.iter() { + let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let cp_pending_msg_events = &peer_state.pending_msg_events; + number_of_msg_events += cp_pending_msg_events.len(); + if cp_pending_msg_events.len() == 1 { + if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } = cp_pending_msg_events[0] { + assert_ne!(*cp_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); + } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); } + } + } + // Expecting the failure backwards event to the previous hop (not `node_b`) + assert_eq!(number_of_msg_events, 1); } else { assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); } @@ -1820,7 +1911,9 @@ pub fn pass_along_path<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_path pub fn pass_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_route: &[&[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]], recv_value: u64, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash, our_payment_secret: PaymentSecret) { let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_route.len()); - for (path_idx, (ev, expected_path)) in events.drain(..).zip(expected_route.iter()).enumerate() { + for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() { + let (ev, updated_events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + events = updated_events; // Once we've gotten through all the HTLCs, the last one should result in a // PaymentClaimable (but each previous one should not!), . let expect_payment = path_idx == expected_route.len() - 1; @@ -1871,10 +1964,18 @@ pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, } } let mut per_path_msgs: Vec<((msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned), PublicKey)> = Vec::with_capacity(expected_paths.len()); - let events = expected_paths[0].last().unwrap().node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + let mut events = expected_paths[0].last().unwrap().node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len()); - for ev in events.iter() { - per_path_msgs.push(msgs_from_ev!(ev)); + + if events.len() == 1 { + per_path_msgs.push(msgs_from_ev!(&events[0])); + } else { + for expected_path in expected_paths.iter() { + // For MPP payments, we always want the message to the first node in the path. + let (ev, updated_events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + per_path_msgs.push(msgs_from_ev!(&ev)); + events = updated_events; + } } for (expected_route, (path_msgs, next_hop)) in expected_paths.iter().zip(per_path_msgs.drain(..)) { @@ -1896,9 +1997,10 @@ pub fn do_claim_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, { $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0); let fee = { - let channel_state = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel = channel_state - .by_id.get(&next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0.channel_id).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id()) + .unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0.channel_id).unwrap(); if let Some(prev_config) = channel.prev_config() { prev_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat } else { @@ -2405,9 +2507,10 @@ pub fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events<'a, 'b, 'c>(nodes: &Vec {{ - let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap(); + ($node: expr, $counterparty_node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{ + let peer_state_lock = $node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let chan_lock = peer_state_lock.get(&$counterparty_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap(); chan.get_value_stat() }} } diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index c7db5d7bd98..c544c368073 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -175,8 +175,11 @@ fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) { } nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message); { - let mut lock; - let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id); + let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }; + let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] }; + let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock; + let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock; + let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id); chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0; chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000; } @@ -686,16 +689,18 @@ fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() { // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx. let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = { - let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer(); let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys(); (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, pubkeys.funding_pubkey) }; let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = { - let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer(); let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys(); (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, @@ -708,8 +713,9 @@ fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() { &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint); let res = { - let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer(); let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![]; let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data( @@ -954,8 +960,8 @@ fn test_update_fee() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); - assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30); - assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30); + assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30); + assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30); close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true); check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); @@ -1321,11 +1327,11 @@ fn test_basic_channel_reserve() { let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat; // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve. - let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2)); + let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2)); let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee; let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1); let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap(); @@ -1378,15 +1384,16 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() { // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver. - let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1; // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx. let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = { - let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer(); // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1; @@ -1398,8 +1405,9 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() { chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey) }; let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = { - let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer(); let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys(); (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, @@ -1426,8 +1434,9 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() { let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1; let res = { - let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer(); let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data( commitment_number, @@ -1677,9 +1686,9 @@ fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() { let feemsat = 239; let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat; - let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); - let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve. let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors); @@ -1768,11 +1777,11 @@ fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() { let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); - let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2); + let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2); + let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2); - let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2); - let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2); + let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2); + let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2); macro_rules! expect_forward { ($node: expr) => {{ @@ -1786,8 +1795,8 @@ fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() { let feemsat = 239; // set above let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat; - let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2); let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat; @@ -1825,10 +1834,10 @@ fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() { claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage); let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = ( - get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2), - get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2), - get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2), - get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2), + get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2), + get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2), + get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2), + get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2), ); assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat); @@ -1879,7 +1888,7 @@ fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() { let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2; let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat; { - let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); + let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2); assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat); } @@ -1995,11 +2004,11 @@ fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() { let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors); let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat); - let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); + let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2); assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self); assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc); - let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2); + let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2); assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3); } @@ -2033,7 +2042,7 @@ fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() { let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2); + let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2); // Route the first two HTLCs. let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000; let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1); @@ -2747,16 +2756,16 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { added_monitors.clear(); } assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); - match events[0] { - MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } - match events[1] { + + let (nodes_2_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + let (nodes_0_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + + match nodes_2_event { MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - match events[2] { + match nodes_0_event { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -2766,6 +2775,13 @@ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; + + // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2 + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast { ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { { let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); @@ -3062,7 +3078,8 @@ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use let value = if use_dust { // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn. - nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000 + nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) + .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000 } else { 3000000 }; let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value); @@ -3182,21 +3199,12 @@ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 }); - match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] { - MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } - match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] { - MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => { - assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2); - assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain."); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } - if deliver_bs_raa { - match events[0] { + + let events = if deliver_bs_raa { + let (nodes_2_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + match nodes_2_event { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); @@ -3206,8 +3214,20 @@ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } + events + } else { events }; + + let (nodes_2_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + match nodes_2_event { + MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => { + assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2); + assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain."); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] { + + let (nodes_0_event, events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + match nodes_0_event { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3); @@ -3252,6 +3272,12 @@ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } + // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2 + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0)); assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0)); assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0)); @@ -4617,15 +4643,15 @@ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3); - match msg_events[0] { - MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } - match msg_events[1] { + let (nodes_2_event, msg_events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg_events); + let (nodes_0_event, msg_events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg_events); + + match nodes_2_event { MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - match msg_events[2] { + + match nodes_0_event { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -4635,6 +4661,13 @@ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; + + // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2 + match msg_events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]); @@ -4884,7 +4917,8 @@ fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, anno send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000); assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2); - let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis; + let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) + .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis; // 0th HTLC: let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee // 1st HTLC: @@ -5593,10 +5627,10 @@ fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() { nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()); - let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat; - let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve. let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors); @@ -5604,7 +5638,7 @@ fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() { // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell. nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); - chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send); // Flush the pending fee update. @@ -5617,7 +5651,7 @@ fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() { // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing // us to surface its failure to the user. - chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0); nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1); let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}", @@ -5671,10 +5705,10 @@ fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() { nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()); - let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat; - let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve. let amt_1 = 20000; @@ -5684,11 +5718,11 @@ fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() { // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell. nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap(); - chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1); let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap(); - chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2); // Flush the pending fee update. @@ -5702,7 +5736,7 @@ fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() { // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs, // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed. - chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0); nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1); let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}", @@ -5798,10 +5832,10 @@ fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() { nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()); - let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2); + let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2); let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat; - let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2); + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2); // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell. let feemsat = 239; @@ -5822,7 +5856,7 @@ fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() { commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); - chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2); + chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2); assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send); // Flush the pending fee update. @@ -5985,7 +6019,8 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64; + let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) + .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64; for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs { let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000); @@ -6026,7 +6061,7 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() { let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let channel_value = 100000; let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat; + let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat; send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight); @@ -6054,8 +6089,9 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() { let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); let htlc_minimum_msat: u64; { - let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(); } @@ -6081,10 +6117,10 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() { let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat; - let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2); + let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2); // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve. let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors); @@ -6160,7 +6196,7 @@ fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() { nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1; + updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1; nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); @@ -6633,7 +6669,8 @@ fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) { let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis; + let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) + .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis; // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000); @@ -6724,7 +6761,8 @@ fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) { let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis; + let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) + .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis; let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000); let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); @@ -7387,8 +7425,9 @@ fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() { let per_commitment_secret; let next_per_commitment_point; { - let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer(); const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1; @@ -7746,8 +7785,9 @@ fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() { // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it. let accept_chan_msg = { - let mut lock; - let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id); + let mut node_1_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_1_peer_state_lock; + let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id); channel.get_accept_channel_message() }; nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg); @@ -7833,7 +7873,7 @@ fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() { let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0); match api_res { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => { - assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist"); + assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); }, Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"), Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"), @@ -8090,12 +8130,15 @@ fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() { let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); - if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) { + { + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2); if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) { assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure); assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed); } else { assert!(false); } - } else { assert!(false); }; + } // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); @@ -8181,14 +8224,17 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() { let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); - if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) { + { + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2); if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) { // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure); assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed); assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed); } else { assert!(false); } - } else { assert!(false); }; + } // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); @@ -8488,6 +8534,56 @@ fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() { do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false); } +#[test] +fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() { + // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same + // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Create an first channel channel + nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Create an second channel + nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same + // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0]. + open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id; + + // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same + // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers. + nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0); + { + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match &events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0); + { + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match &events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } +} + #[test] fn test_duplicate_chan_id() { // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is @@ -8576,12 +8672,13 @@ fn test_duplicate_chan_id() { create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event let funding_created = { - let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead). - let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap(); + let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap(); let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap() }; @@ -9180,7 +9277,8 @@ fn test_double_partial_claim() { let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); - pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None); + let (node_1_msgs, _events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None); // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim. @@ -9236,9 +9334,10 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42); if on_holder_tx { - if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) { - chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546; - } + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id); + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546; } nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap(); @@ -9253,8 +9352,9 @@ fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_e update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update); let dust_buffer_feerate = { - let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 }; let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000; diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs index 1cb32bed08d..0ad392131ac 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs @@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() { let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }; assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 @@ -269,8 +269,8 @@ fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) { let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id); // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats @@ -624,8 +624,8 @@ fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() { check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); @@ -776,8 +776,8 @@ fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() { let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1; let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the @@ -1052,9 +1052,9 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bo // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id); - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1; @@ -1288,8 +1288,8 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() { claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]); @@ -1508,8 +1508,8 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() { check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx); check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction - let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id); - let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64; + let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id); + let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64; { let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap(); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/onion_route_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/onion_route_tests.rs index 4f90202fd2f..cad6952d36d 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/onion_route_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/onion_route_tests.rs @@ -503,7 +503,9 @@ fn test_onion_failure() { Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure{short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}), Some(short_channel_id)); let short_channel_id = channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id; - let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1; + let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) + .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap() + .get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1; let mut bogus_route = route.clone(); let route_len = bogus_route.paths[0].len(); bogus_route.paths[0][route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward; diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs index 6c3f98df406..34f71047dc0 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs @@ -146,11 +146,11 @@ fn mpp_retry() { assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); // Pass half of the payment along the success path. - let success_path_msgs = events.remove(0); + let (success_path_msgs, mut events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 2_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), success_path_msgs, false, None); // Add the HTLC along the first hop. - let fail_path_msgs_1 = events.remove(0); + let (fail_path_msgs_1, _events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); let (update_add, commitment_signed) = match fail_path_msgs_1 { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); @@ -230,7 +230,8 @@ fn do_mpp_receive_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) { assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); // Pass half of the payment along the first path. - pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 200_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.remove(0), false, None); + let (node_1_msgs, mut events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 200_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None); if send_partial_mpp { // Time out the partial MPP @@ -257,7 +258,8 @@ fn do_mpp_receive_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) { expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain().expected_htlc_error_data(23, &[][..])); } else { // Pass half of the payment along the second path. - pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 200_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.remove(0), true, None); + let (node_2_msgs, _events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &events); + pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 200_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_2_msgs, true, None); // Even after MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS we should not timeout the MPP if we have all the parts for _ in 0..MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS { @@ -436,7 +438,7 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) { MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), msg); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_string() }); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1); }, @@ -500,8 +502,10 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) { // and not the original fee. We also update node[1]'s relevant config as // do_claim_payment_along_route expects us to never overpay. { - let mut channel_state = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id_2).unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) + .unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let mut channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&chan_id_2).unwrap(); let mut new_config = channel.config(); new_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 100_000; channel.update_config(&new_config); @@ -599,7 +603,7 @@ fn do_test_completed_payment_not_retryable_on_reload(use_dust: bool) { MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), msg); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_string() }); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); }, @@ -1267,10 +1271,12 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ { let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs(); - let node_0_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let node_1_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_1 = node_0_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_1_id).unwrap(); - let channel_2 = node_1_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_2_id).unwrap(); + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let mut node_1_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_1_peer_state_lock; + let channel_1 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id); + let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id); let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) , @@ -1292,10 +1298,12 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ { let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs(); - let node_0_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let node_1_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_1 = node_0_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_1_id).unwrap(); - let channel_2 = node_1_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_2_id).unwrap(); + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let mut node_1_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_1_peer_state_lock; + let channel_1 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id); + let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id); let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) , @@ -1318,10 +1326,12 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){ { let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs(); - let node_0_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let node_1_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_1 = node_0_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_1_id).unwrap(); - let channel_2 = node_1_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_2_id).unwrap(); + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let mut node_1_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_1_peer_state_lock; + let channel_1 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id); + let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id); let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) , @@ -1362,8 +1372,9 @@ fn test_holding_cell_inflight_htlcs() { let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs(); { - let channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel = channel_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, channel_id); let used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat( &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) , @@ -1465,7 +1476,7 @@ fn do_test_intercepted_payment(test: InterceptTest) { // Check for unknown channel id error. let unknown_chan_id_err = nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &[42; 32], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amount_msat).unwrap_err(); - assert_eq!(unknown_chan_id_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!([42; 32])) }); + assert_eq!(unknown_chan_id_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!([42; 32]), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) }); if test == InterceptTest::Fail { // Ensure we can fail the intercepted payment back. diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/reload_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/reload_tests.rs index 1f0c781d003..486a5ee2df3 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/reload_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/reload_tests.rs @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) { if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg { match action { &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => { - assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel"); + assert_eq!(msg.data, format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"), @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) { nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() }); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false); } @@ -699,8 +699,10 @@ fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) { // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentClaimable event let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2); - do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None); - do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None); + let (node_1_msgs, mut send_events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_events); + let (node_2_msgs, _send_events) = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_events); + do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, true, false, None); + do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_2_msgs, true, false, None); // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors. diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs index c261c3d6ead..b6b454c5338 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use crate::prelude::*; -use core::mem; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::TxMerkleNode; @@ -267,10 +266,12 @@ fn do_test_unconf_chan(reload_node: bool, reorg_after_reload: bool, use_funding_ let chan_conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1); - assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len(), 2); - mem::drop(channel_state); + { + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(peer_state.channel_by_id.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len(), 2); + } assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].confirmations, Some(10)); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].confirmations, Some(10)); @@ -303,8 +304,9 @@ fn do_test_unconf_chan(reload_node: bool, reorg_after_reload: bool, use_funding_ handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs."); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); { - let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(peer_state.channel_by_id.len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len(), 0); } } @@ -354,8 +356,9 @@ fn do_test_unconf_chan(reload_node: bool, reorg_after_reload: bool, use_funding_ handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs."); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); { - let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0); + let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(peer_state.channel_by_id.len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len(), 0); } } diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/shutdown_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/shutdown_tests.rs index 6a0d7c61fb9..60d5dc85cd2 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/shutdown_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/shutdown_tests.rs @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) { // closing_signed so we do it ourselves check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_string() }); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }); } assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); @@ -557,13 +557,13 @@ fn test_invalid_upfront_shutdown_script() { open_channel.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Present(Builder::new().push_int(0) .push_slice(&[0, 0]) .into_script()); - nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel); + nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => { - assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(msg.data, "Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: Script(OP_0 OP_PUSHBYTES_2 0000)"); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), @@ -761,8 +761,9 @@ fn do_test_closing_signed_reinit_timeout(timeout_step: TimeoutStep) { // nodes[1] should happily accept and respond to. node_0_closing_signed.fee_range.as_mut().unwrap().max_fee_satoshis *= 10; { - let mut lock; - get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], lock, chan_id).closing_fee_limits.as_mut().unwrap().1 *= 10; + let mut node_0_per_peer_lock; + let mut node_0_peer_state_lock; + get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_id).closing_fee_limits.as_mut().unwrap().1 *= 10; } nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed); let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); diff --git a/lightning/src/util/fairrwlock.rs b/lightning/src/util/fairrwlock.rs index c9b3866bec5..5715a8cf646 100644 --- a/lightning/src/util/fairrwlock.rs +++ b/lightning/src/util/fairrwlock.rs @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -use std::sync::{LockResult, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard}; +use std::sync::{LockResult, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard, TryLockResult}; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; /// Rust libstd's RwLock does not provide any fairness guarantees (and, in fact, when used on @@ -43,4 +43,8 @@ impl FairRwLock { // codebase. self.lock.read() } + + pub fn try_write(&self) -> TryLockResult> { + self.lock.try_write() + } }