crypto/internal/fips/aes/gcm: add GCMForSSH

For #69536

Change-Id: Ia368f515893a95e176149e23239a8e253fc5272f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/629095
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <[email protected]>

Author: FiloSottile

src/crypto/cipher/gcm_test.go

@@ -795,3 +795,76 @@ func TestFIPSServiceIndicator(t *testing.T) {
 	// Wrap with overflow.
 	expectPanic(t, g, []byte{1, 2, 3, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0})
 }
+
+func TestGCMForSSH(t *testing.T) {
+	// incIV from x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go.
+	incIV := func(iv []byte) {
+		for i := 4 + 7; i >= 4; i-- {
+			iv[i]++
+			if iv[i] != 0 {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	expectOK := func(aead cipher.AEAD, iv []byte) {
+		aead.Seal(nil, iv, []byte("hello, world"), nil)
+	}
+
+	expectPanic := func(aead cipher.AEAD, iv []byte) {
+		defer func() {
+			if recover() == nil {
+				t.Errorf("expected panic")
+			}
+		}()
+		aead.Seal(nil, iv, []byte("hello, world"), nil)
+	}
+
+	key := make([]byte, 16)
+	block, _ := fipsaes.New(key)
+	aead, err := gcm.NewGCMForSSH(block)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	iv := decodeHex(t, "11223344"+"0000000000000000")
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	incIV(iv)
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	iv = decodeHex(t, "11223344"+"fffffffffffffffe")
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	incIV(iv)
+	expectPanic(aead, iv)
+
+	aead, _ = gcm.NewGCMForSSH(block)
+	iv = decodeHex(t, "11223344"+"fffffffffffffffe")
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	incIV(iv)
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	incIV(iv)
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	incIV(iv)
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+
+	aead, _ = gcm.NewGCMForSSH(block)
+	iv = decodeHex(t, "11223344"+"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa")
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	iv = decodeHex(t, "11223344"+"ffffffffffffffff")
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	incIV(iv)
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	iv = decodeHex(t, "11223344"+"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa8")
+	expectOK(aead, iv)
+	incIV(iv)
+	expectPanic(aead, iv)
+	iv = decodeHex(t, "11223344"+"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb")
+	expectPanic(aead, iv)
+}
+
+func decodeHex(t *testing.T, s string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	b, err := hex.DecodeString(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return b
+}

src/crypto/internal/fips/aes/gcm/gcm_nonces.go

@@ -201,3 +201,57 @@ func (g *GCMForTLS13) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error)
 	fips.RecordApproved()
 	return g.g.Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data)
 }
+
+// NewGCMForSSH returns a new AEAD that works like GCM, but enforces the
+// construction of nonces as specified in RFC 5647.
+//
+// This complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario 1.d.
+func NewGCMForSSH(cipher *aes.Block) (*GCMForSSH, error) {
+	g, err := newGCM(&GCM{}, cipher, gcmStandardNonceSize, gcmTagSize)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &GCMForSSH{g: *g}, nil
+}
+
+type GCMForSSH struct {
+	g     GCM
+	ready bool
+	start uint64
+	next  uint64
+}
+
+func (g *GCMForSSH) NonceSize() int { return gcmStandardNonceSize }
+
+func (g *GCMForSSH) Overhead() int { return gcmTagSize }
+
+func (g *GCMForSSH) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != gcmStandardNonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+
+	counter := byteorder.BeUint64(nonce[len(nonce)-8:])
+	if !g.ready {
+		// In the first call we learn the start value.
+		g.ready = true
+		g.start = counter
+	}
+	counter -= g.start
+
+	// Ensure the counter is monotonically increasing.
+	if counter == math.MaxUint64 {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: counter wrapped")
+	}
+	if counter < g.next {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: counter decreased")
+	}
+	g.next = counter + 1
+
+	fips.RecordApproved()
+	return g.g.sealAfterIndicator(dst, nonce, plaintext, data)
+}
+
+func (g *GCMForSSH) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	fips.RecordApproved()
+	return g.g.Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data)
+}